Can the IRS go after you for not making enough profit?
There is a whistleblower case against Vanguard, the mutual fund giant. Even though there is a tax angle, I had previously sidestepped the matter. Surely it must involve some mind-numbing arcana, and –anyway- why enable some ex-employee with a grudge?
And then I saw a well-known University of Michigan tax professor supporting the tax issues in the whistleblower case.
Now I had to look into the matter.
My first reaction is that this case represents tax law gone wild. It happens. Sometimes tax law is like the person looking down at his/her cell phone and running into you in the hall. They are too self-absorbed to look up and get a clue.
What sets this up is the management company: Vanguard Group, Inc. (VGI). Take a look at other mutual fund companies and you will see that the management company is separately and independently owned from the mutual funds themselves. The management company provides investment, financial and other services, and in turn it receives fees from the mutual funds.
The management company receives fees irrespective of whether the funds are doing well or poorly. In addition, the ownership of the management company is likely different from the ownership of the funds. You can invest in the management company for T. Rowe Price (TROW), for example, even if you do not own any T. Rowe Price funds.
Vanguard however has a unique structure. Its management company – VGI – is owned by the funds themselves. Why? It goes back to Jack Bogle and the founding of Vanguard: he believed there was an inherent conflict of interest when a mutual fund is advised by a manager not motivated by the same financial interests as fund shareholders. Since the management company and the funds are essentially one-and-the-same, there is little motivation for the management company to maximize its fees. This in turn has allowed Vanguard funds to provide some of the lowest internal costs in the industry
My first thought is that every mutual fund family should be run this way.
VGI and all the funds are C corporations under the tax Code. The funds themselves are more specialized and are “registered investment companies” under Subchapter M. Because the funds own VGI, the “transfer pricing” rules of IRC Section 482 apply.
COMMENT: The intent of Section 482 is to limit the ability of related companies to manipulate the prices they charge each other. Generally speaking, this Code section has not been an issue for practitioners like me, as we primarily serve entrepreneurs and their closely-held companies. This market tends to be heavily domestic and unlikely to include software development, patent or other activity which can easily be moved overseas and trigger transfer pricing concerns.
Practitioners are however starting to see states pursue transfer pricing issues. Take Iowa, with its 12% corporate tax rate as an example. Let’s presume a multistate client with significant Iowa operations. Be assured that I would be looking to move profitability from Iowa to a lower taxed state. From Iowa’s perspective, this would be a transfer pricing issue. From my perspective it is common sense.
Section 482 wants to be sure that related entities are charging arm’s-length prices to each other. There are selected exceptions for less-than-arm’s-length prices, such as for providing routine, ministerial and administrative services. I suppose one could argue that the maintenance and preparation of investor statements might fit under this exception, but it is doubtful that the provision of investment advisory services would. Those services involve highly skilled money managers, and are arguably far from routine and ministerial.
So VGI must arguably show a profit, at least for its advisory services. How much profit?
Now starts the nerds running into you in the hall while looking down at their cell phones.
We have to look at what other fund families are doing: Janus, Fidelity, Eaton Vance and so on. We know that Vanguard is unique, so we can anticipate that their management fees are going to be higher, potentially much higher. An analysis of Morningstar data indicates as much as 0.5 percent higher. It doesn’t sound like much, until you consider that Vanguard has approximately $3 trillion under management. Multiply any non-zero number by $3 trillion and you are talking real money.
It is an interesting argument, although it also appears that the IRS was not considering Vanguard’s fact pattern when it issued Regulations. Vanguard has been doing this for 40 years and the IRS has not concerned itself, so one could presume that there is a détente of sorts. Perhaps the IRS realized how absurd it would be to force the management company to charge more to millions of Vanguard investors.
That might attract the attention of Congress, for example, which already is not the biggest fan of the IRS as currently administrated.
Not to mention that since the IRS issued the Regulations, the IRS can change the Regulations.
And all that presumes that we are correctly interpreting an arcane area of tax law.
The whistleblower is a previous tax attorney with Vanguard, and he argues that Vanguard has been underpaying its income taxes by not charging its fund investors enough.
Think about that for a moment. Who is the winner in this Alice-in-Wonderland scenario?
The whistleblower says that he brought his concerns to the attention of his superiors (presumably tax attorneys themselves), arguing that the tax structure was illegal. They disagreed with him. He persisted until he was fired.
He did however attract the attention of the SEC, IRS and state of New York.
I had previously dismissed the whistleblower argument as a fevered interpretation of the transfer pricing rules and the tantrum of an ex-employee bent on retribution. I must now reevaluate after tax law Professor Reuven S. Avi-Yonah has argued in favor of this case.
I am however reminded of my own experience. There is a trust tax provision that entered the Code in 1986. In the aughts I had a client with that tax issue. The IRS had not issued Regulations, 20 years later. The IRS had informally disclosed its internal position, however, and it was (of course) contrary to what my client wanted. I in turn disagreed with the IRS and believed they would lose if the position were litigated. I advised the client that taking the position was a concurrent decision to litigate and should be addressed as such.
I became extremely unpopular with the client. Even my partner was stressed to defend me. I was basing professional tax advice on chewing gum and candy wrappers, as there was nothing else to go on.
And eventually someone litigated the issue. The case was decided in 2014, twenty eight years after the law was passed. The taxpayer won.
Who is to say that Vanguard’s situation isn’t similar?
What does this tax guy think?
I preface by saying that I respect Professor Avi-Yonah, but I am having a very difficult time accepting the whistleblower argument. Vanguard investors own the Vanguard funds, and the funds in turn own the management company. I may not teach law at the University of Michigan, but I can extrapolate that Vanguard investors own the management company – albeit indirectly – and should be able to charge themselves whatever they want, subject to customary business-purpose principles. Since tax avoidance is not a principal purpose, Section 482 should not be sticking its nose under the tent.
Do you wonder why the IRS would even care? Any income not reported by the management company would be reported by fund investors. The Treasury gets its pound of flesh - except to the extent that the funds belong to retirement plans. Retirement plans do not pay taxes. On the other hand, retirement plan beneficiaries pay taxes when the plan finally distributes. Treasury is not out any money; it just has to wait. Oh well.
It speaks volumes that someone can parse through the tax Code and arrive at a different conclusion. If fault exists, it lies with the tax Code, not with Vanguard.
Then why bring a whistleblower case? The IRS will pay a whistleblower up to 30% of any recovery, and there are analyses that the Vanguard management company could be on the hook for approximately $30 billion in taxes. Color me cynical, but I suspect that is the real reason.
About the author
Steven D. Hamilton is a career CPA, with extensive experience involving all aspects of tax practice, including sophisticated income tax planning and handling of tax controversy matters for closely-held businesses and high-income individuals.